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Abstract
The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their
"types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where
"good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a sig-
nalling game without types hierarchy. Di¤erent types have the same average qualities but
di¤erent proles of quality over time which are their private information. We apply this
idea to analyze a nancing-investment game where rmsinsiders have private information
about the rms prot prole over time. If transporting cash between period is costless
equilibrium is pooling with up-front equity nancing. Otherwise equilibrium is either pool-
ing with debt when the economy is stagnating, or separating when the economy is growing
(some rms issue debt and some rms issue shares). This provides new theoretical results
that cannot be explained by the standard GB models and which are consistent with some
nancial market phenomena.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, Non-hierarchical signalling, Financing,
Debt-equity choice, Equilibrium renements, Intuitive criterion, Mispricing
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1 Introduction
The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their
"types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where
"good" type denotes the type with better quality. Depending on the context, the quality
could mean the quality of produced good, the ability to work etc. Typically in such a game,
the "good" type tries to signal its type to uninformed players by sending the messages
which cannot be mimicked by the "bad" type.1 In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling
game without types hierarchy. Di¤erent types have the same average qualities but di¤erent
performances proles over time which are their private information. Hence a "good" type in
the beginning may become "bad" in the end or "bad" in the beginning may become "good"
in the end. We apply this idea to analyze a nancing-investment game where rmsinsiders
have private information about the rms prot prole over time.2
More specically, we analyze a situation where a rms initial shareholders have to raise
funds for nancing an investment project. There is no internal funds available and therefore
the nancing should be external. The cost of investment is known to the shareholders and
to the potential investors while the expected prot is the shareholdersprivate information.
Such a situation in a static context (one period) was well studied in the literature. The
equilibrium is typically pooling where all rms issue debt which survive usual equilibrium
renements and which minimizes mispricing (undervaluation) for a "good" type, i. e. for
a rm with high expected prot.3 We thus consider a two-period situation. In each period
there is an investment and a prot. As was noted previously we suppose that di¤erent types
have the same average prot but di¤erent prot proles over time which are their private
information. Also, we assume that managers have the choice between issuing debt or equity.
The solution of the game we obtained shares with the standard models the existence of
pooling equilibrium with debt. However, in our game a separating equilibrium (which is
e¢ cient by denition) may exist as well. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the initial
distribution of types in the economy.
To provide basic ideas about how the private information about rms prot prole over
time can a¤ect nancing choice let us suppose that there are only two types of rms. One
is performance-improving (I) and have an increasing expected prot, while others are
stagnant (S) and have a atter or decreasing expected prot. In such an environment,
prices can be a¤ected by the lemone¤ect in both periods.4 Intuitively, I would seem to
have an informational advantage in the rst period: because of lower prots in this period,
this type of rm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, in
the second period the informational advantage passes to S. We show that I and S face
very di¤erent incentives regarding nancial decisions. The point is that, generally speaking,
debt has a shorter maturity than equity, which has by denition innite maturity. Thus,
the price of rst-period equity is type-independent due to the two-period maturity of equity
(contrary to the one-period of debt) and to the fact that both types face the same total
1For a review of signalling games see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) or Petrosjan and Zenke-
vich (1996).
2 In the similar spirit, some researchers assume that rms have the same average prot but di¤erent
parameteres of risk which are their private information. For example, in the second part of Brennan and
Kraus (1986) cash ows are ordered by mean-preserving spread condition. It is shown that optimal securities
are neither convex nor concave in this case. In Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998) rmsprots have the same
average value but di¤erent variances. The authors do obtain some results about rm dividend policy.
3See, for instance, Nachman and Noe (1994).
4We use the term "lemon" problem to describe a situation where private information leads to underpricing
for a "good" type. See Akerlo¤ (1970) for a classical example.
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prot over the two periods. As a result, if I were to issue equity in the rst period, they
would always be mimicked by S, who stand to gain in the second period by being perceived
as growing and, therefore, as expecting high prots in the second period. The implication
is that I are at a disadvantage for equity issues in the rst period. This is the main engine
driving the results of this article.
While I would denitely prefer debt to equity, incentives for S depend on the macro-
economic situation or on the initial distribution of types in the economy. The idea here
is that if the economy is growing there are on average more performance-improving than
stagnating rms interest rates tend to be more suitable for I. In particular, rst-period
interest rates would be relatively high compared to those of the second period, because I is
considered badin the rst period and goodin the second. Given such an interest rate
prole, we show that if S plays debt, it would be benecial to creditors, but not to the rm.
This is because the creditors benet in the rst period due to the high interest rates and to
the fact that S does well at that period.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model and some preliminary
results are presented in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 provide the analysis of two-type and
multiple-type economies respectively. The conclusion is drawn in Section 5.
2 Model.
Consider a rm with two-stage investment project. In each stage t = 1; 2 an amount b has
to be invested. In each stage the project can either be successful (with probability t) or
unsuccessful (with probability 1  t). If the former is the case the revenue eRt equals 1 and
if the latter is the case the revenue equals 0. Total expected revenue over both periods is
then 1 + 2. Since all rms have the same total discounted prot, total revenue can be
normalized to unity without loss of generality. Hence 1 + 2 = 1 and we write 1 = 
and 2 = 1   . Firms di¤er only through the parameter . We assume b < 1=2 with the
s restricted to the interval [b; 1   b], which implies that the investment has non-negative
protability in each period, i. e. the expected prot is not smaller than the amount of
investments in period one (b  ) and in period two (b  1   ). A rm has increasing
expected revenues and prots if  < 1=2, the prot prole is at or declining if  = 1=2 or
 > 1=2 respectively. If we let  be distributed according to the density f(), then the total
(average) rst-period revenue is:
y =
Z 1 b
b
f() d
Clearly, total second-period revenue is then 1  y. This means that the economy is growing
(revenues and prots are increasing) if y < 1=2, and it is stagnant or declining if y = 1=2 or
y > 1=2.
The rms shareholders are responsible for capital structure choice, investments and
prot distribution. The initial capital structure is 100% equity, with n shares outstanding.
The rm maximizes wealth of initial shareholders, who we will call the entrepreneur. Let
0 and 0 denote the initial proportions of equity owned respectively by outsiders and
entrepreneur and let t and t denote their proportions immediately after the nancing
and investment for stage t were done. Clearly, 0 = 1, 0 = 0 and t + t = 1 for all t.
There exists universal risk-neutrality in this economy. In addition, the competition
among investors is perfect. Insider shareholders know the rms type, but the investors do
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not. The distribution of types is common knowledge.
To nance the rst stage, the rm may issue either debt (d) or equity (e).5 In both cases,
the rm gets amount b from the market, which is immediately invested. Holding free cash
ow is costly. The reasons are well-known: empire buildingor ine¢ cient investments and
acquisitions, which spread the resources under the managers control; increasing manager
compensations or direct entrenchment; etc.6 More specically, we assume that any available
free cash ow disappears immediately, producing useless loss for the shareholders.7 Knowing
this the shareholders will never keep the free cash that implies that any available rst-period
prot will be distributed as dividend. Thus, in the second period only debt nancing is
possible.8 ;9 As in the standard literature in this eld, we assume that the contract of debt
is enforceable at no cost.
The sequence of events is illustrated in gure 1. We assume that the rms type is
revealed to initial insiders in the period 0. The investors are identical and we will call them
simply the market. The market determines the prices of issued securities. Also the market
observes the rst-period capital structure choice. However, it does not observe the prot
previously realized by the rm.
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firms type
is realized
It is revealed to
entrepreneur
Entrepreneur decides
whether to issue equity
or debt
Securities are issued
Market determines the
prices of securities
Investment is made
Project yields R1
It is distributed to
the claimholders
Firm issues
second-period debt
Market determines the
prices of securities
Investment is made
Project yields R2
It is distributed
to the claimholders
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
5More complicated securities are not considered here since the models implications are all about equity-
debt choice. Also, for the simplicity of exposition, we assume that only pure strategies can be played,
although this is not crucial to the results.
6Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986). See also [7] and [14] for empirical analysis about the signicance of
managers agency cost in holding cash
7We assume free cash to be any available cash at the end of a period, which means any resources that
were not invested during the period or any received prots that were not used for interests or dividends.
8This is based on Myers and Majlufs (1984) idea that in one-period setting under asymmetric infor-
mation, equity is never issued. Although our environments are quite di¤erent, one can show that the
introduction of the possibility of equity issue in the second period does not alter any results.
9To simplify, we assume that mixed nancing (debt/equity in the rst period or cash/debt in the second)
is not possible. The basic intuitions developed within this paper are not a¤ected by introducing these
possibilities. It is also important to note that the model can be extended by allowing mixed strategies (in
game-theoretic terms), which can be interpreted to some extent as real mixed nancing.
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Throughout this article, we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria (PBE) and
also verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive usual renements like Cho and Kreps(1987)
intuitive criterion and consistency (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). The intuitive criterion seems
to be not very powerful in games where pooling equilibrium is Pareto-e¢ cient (see Cadsby,
Frank, and Maksimovic, 1998). Fortunately, this is not the case in the present paper. In
addition, note that perfect competition between outsiders implies zero market prot and
risk-neutral valuation for any security issued. More specically, we assume that there are at
least two investors and the competition among them is in the Bertrand style (see Cho and
Kreps (1987) or Nachman and Noe (1994)). Their pricing strategies are identical and equal
to the expected value of the o¤ered securities. Competition in the capital market therefore
results in the price that yields zero net prot to investors.
From denition of debt and equity it follows that if debt is issued in period t with face
value D then the debtholders expected payo¤ equals E
h
min( eRt; D)i. The shareholders are
residual claimants. If new equity was issued the shareholders share the prot according to
the number of shares owned.
2.1 Perfect market.
This subsection provides some useful information about benchmark pricing when the market
knows the rms type. Consider strategy e. Denote the issue of shares in period 1 by n,
the price of issued shares by p1e and the second period debt face value by D
2
e . The relations
describing the pricing and the payo¤s are:
1) rst-period budget constraint:
b = p1en (1)
2) market valuation of second-period debt:
b = E
h
min( eR2; D2e)i (2)
3) market valuation of equity issued in the rst period (recall that n denotes the initial
number of shares):
p1e =
R1
n+n
+
E
h
max(0; eR2  D2e)i
n+n
(3)
where E[ eR] = R. Given the identity:
min(R;D) + max(0; R D) = R (4)
and using equations (1) and (2), we can transform (3) to:
p1e =
R1 +R2   2b
n
Since R1 +R2 = 1, we get
p1e =
1  2b
n
(5)
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Remark 1. p1e depends only on the rms total prot and not on its prot prole over
time.
Using equation (2) and conducting a similar exercise for strategy d (for type ), one can
obtain the e¢ cient (symmetric information) face values of debt (for the rst and second
period respectively):
D1d = b=;D
2
d = b=(1  ) (6)
If  < 1=2, the interest rate proles in the case of d corresponding to type  is downward
sloping (and upward sloping if  > 1=2, respectively). Finally, note that regardless of how
the investment is nanced, the value of the rm for the entrepreneur is:
V = 1  2b (7)
For example if e is played then the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ equals
nR1
n+n
+
nE
h
max(0; eR2  D2e)i
n+n
Taken into account (3) and (5) this equals 1  2b. As usual, in perfect market, the choice of
nancing does not matter.
2.2 Asymmetric information.
Now consider the situation where the rms type is its private information. Let us introduce
the payo¤-functions. Denote by Vj(;b) the entrepreneurs nal payo¤ if the rm is of type
 but is perceived as type b, given the rst-period action j = e; d. The following explains
why the analysis of these functions is useful. Suppose that the market beliefs observing
strategy j are characterized by a density function j() with support [b; 1  b].
Lemma 1. Let the market beliefs observing strategy j = e; d be j. The pricing is then
as if the market believes with probability 1 that the rm is type bj, where
bj = Z j()d
Proof. Consider j = d. Let rst-period debt face value equals D1d. The rst-period
lendersexpected rst-period payo¤ is then:
R
D1d
j()d. Risk-neutral valuation implies
that it should be equal to b. Thus
D1d =
bR
j()d
Analogously for second-period debt:
D2d =
bR
(1  )j()d
Lemma 1 follows from (6). Now consider j = e. For second-period debt face value the
reasoning is exactly as for D2d. Now consider the rst-period share price. Since the rms
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total expected prot equals 1 and since the second-period lendersexpected payo¤ equals
b, the prot of insiders plus the prot of rst-period outsiders of rm j equals 1  b. Also,
in the case of e, 2o (that also shows the fraction of equity held by the rst-period outsiders
in the moment of rst-period prot distribution) equals nn+n . Thus, expected prot of
rst-period outsider shareholders is:
n
n+n
(1  b)
Risk-neutral valuation implies that the expected revenue of rst-period outsiders is b.
Thus: nn+n (1   b) = b and n = bn1 2b , which implies (because we know the budget
constraint p1en = b) that
p1e =
1  2b
n
(8)
End proof.10
Note that under perfect information, the rst-period share price equals 1 2bn , regardless
of the issuers type (equation (5)). The same result holds true under asymmetric information.
It provides the intuition as to why growing rms prefer debt to equity they cannot use
their informational advantage in the rst-period playing equity because the price is always
the same.
Consider the features of functions Vj(;b) for j = e; d. If the entrepreneur plays e
2c =
n
n+n
=
n
n+ b=p1e
=
1  2b
1  b
as implied by (8). Thus
Ve(;b) = 1  2b
1  b ( + (1  )(1 
b
1  b )) (9)
Also:
Vd(;b) = (1  b=b) + (1  )(1  b=(1  b)) (10)
Obviously, Vj(; ) = 1   2b; j = e; d, since this corresponds to complete information
valuation. Observe also that Vd(; 1=2) = 1  2b. The following properties are obvious:
Lemma 2. @Ve(;
b)
@ > 0 and
@Ve(;b)
@b < 0:
The idea behind Lemma 2 is that since the rst-best share price in the rst period is
the same for all types, the types with high  benet from their informational advantages in
the second period (when they are really lemons). On the other hand, a larger b means a
larger second-period interest rate, which is unprotable.
Lemma 3. Vd(;b)  1  2b if and only if   b  1=2 or 1=2  b  . Furthermore
sign(
@Vd(;b)
@
) = sign(b   1=2) (11)
10Note that the same result holds true if one introduces the possibility for second-period outsiders to
observe rst-period prot realization, given that market beliefs are Bayesian.
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b < min(; 1=2)) @Vd(;b)
@b > 0 (12)
b > max(; 1=2)) @Vd(;b)
@b < 0 (13)
Proof.
Vd(;b)  1  2b, b + 1  1  b  2,
(b)  (1  b) + (1  )b   2b(1  b)  0;
where  is convex with roots b = 1=2 and b = . This proves the rst statement. The proof
of (11) follows from:
@Vd(;b)
@
=   (1  2
b)bb(1  b)
To prove (12) and (13) one can check that
sign(
@Vd(;b)
@b ) = sign( 1     ( b1  b )2)
Now b < min(; 1=2) implies 1  > ( b1 b )2 while b > max(; 1=2) implies 1  < ( b1 b )2.
End proof.
Intuitively, by analogy with perfect information case, a downward sloping interest rates
prole (b  1=2) is suitable for growing rms, i. e. for rms with   b and not for rms
with lower than average rate of growth ( > b), which are better o¤ with upward sloping
interest rate prole. Conversely for the case of stagnating economy (1=2  b). The intuition
behind condition (11) is the same. Now consider equation (12). If the interest rate prole
is downward sloping then, for a rm that has lower than average rate of growth, making
interest rate prole less upward sloping is protable. On the other hand, if the interest rate
prole is upward sloping then, for a rm with higher than average rate of growth, making
the interest rate prole deeper is unprotable (equation (13)).
Lemma 4. sign(Vd(;b)  Ve(;b)) = sign(b   ).
Proof. Consider Vd(;b)  Ve(;b). That is:
1  b(b + 1  1  b )  1  2b1  b ( + (1  )(1  b1  b )) = (b   )(1  b  b)b(1  b)(1  b)b (14)
The sign of the last expression depend obviously on the sign of b   . End proof.
Figure 2 illustrates the rst parts of Lemmas 2 and 3, condition (11) and Lemma 4.
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Figure 2. Vd(;b) and Ve(;b) when: a) b < 1=2; b) b > 1=2.
In both cases Ve(;b) is increasing in . When b < 1=2 (Figure 2a), Vd(;b) is downward
sloping in  and is upward sloping if b > 1=2 (Figure 2b). If the latter is the case the slope
of Ve(;b) is greater than that of Vd(;b) meaning that the payo¤ from the strategy debt
is less sensitive to adverse selection problem as compared to equity. This is in keeping with
most of the literature in this eld. Intuitively, if a rm is perceived as a less growing type
than it is in reality then it will prefer debt to equity. This is because the second-period
interest rate is the same in either case, but by playing debt, the rm gains in the rst period
by being a bad rm-type. If, in contrast, a rm is perceived by the market as a less growing
than in reality type, it would prefer equity.
3 Two-type economy.
To generate the basic ideas, we rst consider a two-type economy. Firm I is characterized
by the parameter I , rm S has parameter S where I < S . By denition, S has better
performance in the rst period while I in the second (note that both may actually be
declining, but S then declines faster). Let 0 be the proportion of type I rms, 0 < 0 < 1.
Hence y = I0 + S(1   0). Since each rm may play two types of strategy (d or e),
there are 4 potential candidates for equilibrium: two separating and two pooling. Given the
concepts described in Section 2 a separating equilibrium is dened as follows:
1) type I plays jI and type S plays jS 6= jI ; jT 2 fe; dg; T 2 fI; Sg.
2) VjI (I ; I)  VjS (I ; S) and VjS (S ; S)  VjI (S ; I).
A pooling two-type equilibrium is dened as follows:
1) both type play j.
2) observing the strategy joff 6= j (o¤-equilibrium path) the market believes that the
type is I with probability I and the type is S with probability S = 1   I such that
Vj(I ; y)  Vjoff (I ; p) and Vj(S ; y)  Vjoff (S ; p), where p = II + SS .
3) If for type T max Vjoff (T ; ) < Vj(T ; y) then T = 0; T 2 fI; Sg.
The rst condition means that di¤erent types play di¤erent strategies under separating
equilibrium and the same strategy under pooling. The second condition represents the non-
deviation condition for each type (individual rationality). Finally, the third condition in
the case of pooling equilibrium assures that the equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion
of Cho and Kreps (1987). This condition means that the market o¤-equilibrium beliefs
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are reasonable in the sense that if for any type T its maximal payo¤ from deviation is not
greater than its equilibrium payo¤ then the market should place the probability 0 on possible
deviations of this type. The denitions above are consistent with standard PBE denition
(see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) with an addition of intuitive criterion which
is quite common in such kind of games (see, for instance, Nachman and Noe, 1994). Finally
note that Lemma 1 insures that in described above equilibria the market makes zero-prot
(competitive rationality).11
Proposition 1. 1) The situation where I plays e and S plays d is not an equilibrium;
2) if and only if I  1=2, there exists a separating equilibrium where I plays d and S plays
e.
Proof. (i) Part 1. Suppose, in opposite, that such equilibrium exists. Of course, each type
would have 1  2b in a separating equilibrium. From Lemma 2 Ve(S ; I) > 1  2b because
I < S . Thus S would deviate from its equilibrium strategy to e and such equilibrium is
impossible.
(ii) Part 2. Let I  1=2. I does not mimic S. From Lemma 2 we have Ve(I ; S)  1 2b
because I < S . S does not mimic I. From Lemma 3, Vd(S ; I)  1 2b because I < 1=2
and I < S . Now, if I > 1=2 then from Lemma 3 Vd(S ; I) > 1   2b. Thus S would
mimic I. End proof.
Intuitively, in the equilibrium described in Part 2, I does not deviate because by playing
e it is not able to capitalize on its rst-period informational advantage. The shares price
in the rst period does not depend on the rms type (Lemma 1), while the interest rate in
the second period will be unfavorable. S does not deviate because the interest rates prole
is downward sloping or at when I  1=2, making d unprotable for S (which performs
better with upward sloping interest rates prole).
Proposition 2. If and only if y  1=2, pooling with d is an equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Part 1. 1) Existence. Let y  1=2. Consider pooling equilibrium where both
types play d, which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market beliefs that the rm is S.12 First
of all, let us verify non-deviation for each type. Since 1=2  y < S ; we gets from Lemma 3
Vd(S ; y)  1  2b. Thus the type S does not deviate. From Lemma 2, we have
Ve(I ; y)  Ve(I ; S) (15)
The condition of non-deviation for the type I is obviously Vd(I ; y)  Ve(I ; S): The latter
follows from the condition (15) and Lemma 4:
Vd(I ; y)  Ve(I ; y)  Ve(I ; S) (16)
Let us now verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987). To show this, let us calculate the maximal payo¤ of type S in the case that it
11Also note that by denition of pooling, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs are consistent (Kreps and Willson,
1982). If out of equilibrium path the market believes that the type is  then it keeps the same beliefs in the
second period (it follows from the denition of the payo¤ functions V ). Otherwise the market o¤-equilibrium
beliefs would be inconsistent.
12Note that in terms of the denition of pooling given above, we have here joff = e, S = 1 and p = S .
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plays e. Its payo¤ is evidently maximized if the markets belief places the probability 1 on
type I observing equity, i. e. Ve(S ; I). If o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive intuitive criterion,
this expression must be greater than Vd(S ; y).13 It follows immediately from Lemmas 2
and 4:
Ve(S ; I)  Ve(S ; y)  Vd(S ; y)
This completes the proof of su¢ ciency.
2) As for the necessary condition, if y < 1=2 then pooling with d is impossible because
type S would deviate in e (from Lemma 3 its equilibrium payo¤ would be less than 1  2b).
End proof.
The idea behind the Proposition 2 is simple. Only if growing rms dominate the credit
market (y < 1=2) will the interest rates prole be downward sloping, creating incentives for
stagnating rms to play e.
Proposition 3. 1) if y < 1=2, pooling with e is not an equilibrium; 2) if y  1=2 and
if pooling with e exists, then mispricing is greater under that than under pooling with d.
Proof: see Appendix 1.14
Intuitively, if y is low, then in the case of pooling with e second-period interest rate
is low, making high prot for the type S. In some cases this prot is even greater than
maximal possible prot under the strategy d. This situation is not an equilibrium because
the market should set the probability 0 on the possibility for S to play d, making o¤-
equilibrium interest rates suitable for the type I; that would deviate to d.15 Secondly, if
pooling with e exists, then mispricing is greater than it is under pooling with d. Intuitively
by analogy with Lemma 4, type I (undervalued under pooling equilibrium, because S can
always achieve at least rst-best using e as a last resort) prefers pooling with debt over
pooling with equity. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are at the root of two major insights of this
paper; they provide clues about the link between initial distribution of types in the economy
and individual rm capital structure policy, and they show why debt is a signal of a rms
increasing performance while equity is a signal of decreasing performance.
The main conclusion of the above analysis is that performance-improving rms denitely
prefer debt while stagnating rms base their strategy on the macroeconomic situation if the
economy is growing, they will issue equity, and if the economy is stagnating, both strategies
can lead to equilibrium. Also note that in a two-type economy, separating equilibrium always
dominates pooling by minimal mispricing. However, the intuition about the existence of
pooling equilibria is useful and it will be further applied in Sections 4 and 5.
4 Multiple type economy.
To provide more ideas about the role of macroeconomic situation in this game, consider
a multiple type economy, and suppose that f() > 0;8 on the support [b; 1  b]. Here
13Otherwise S should be equal to 0.
14We use the standard concept of mispricing that can be found, for example, in Nachman and Noe (1994).
The magnitude of mispricing in a given equilibrium equals to that of undervalued types. For instance, if
the strategy j is played by undervalued type T (the undervaluation is only possible in pooling) then the
mispricng equals 1   2b   Vj(T; y). The overvaluation of overvalued type does not matter. Note that the
total prot in the economy is always the same across di¤erent equilibriums.
15Remark that, since y < 1=2 implies I < 1=2, a separating equilibrium exists in this case.
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again we consider two types of equilibria: pooling and semi-separating (or two-strategy
equilibrium). A two-strategy equilibrium is dened as follows:
1) There are two sets e and d such that any  2 e plays e and any  2 d plays d,
e \d = O, e [d = [b; 1  b] and the measure of probability of O equals 0.
2) Ve(; 
e)  Vd(; d), 8 2 e and Vd(; d)  Vd(; e), where e = 1M(e)
R
2e f()d
and d = 1M(d)
R
2d f()d.
Note that M(j) is the measure of probability of j and 
j denotes the expected type
of rms playing j 2 fe; dg. A pooling equilibrium is dened as follows:
1) all types play j.
2) observing the strategy joff 6= j (o¤-equilibrium path) the market beliefs are joff
such that Vj(; y)  Vjoff (; joff ),8, where joff =
R
joff ()d.
3) if for type  max Vjoff (; ) < Vj(; y) then 
joff () = 0, where  =
R
()d.
In each case the rst condition means that both strategies are played in two-strategy
equilibrium and that all types play the same strategy under pooling. The second condition
represents the non-deviation condition for each type (individual rationality). Finally, the
third condition in the case of pooling equilibrium assures that the equilibrium survives the
intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Proposition 4. 1) In any two-strategy equilibrium, there exists  2 (b; 1   b) such
that rms with  >  play e and rms with  <  play d; 2) If y  1=2 (non-declining
economy), this equilibrium exists.
(i) Proof of part 1. Since both strategies are played, the Ve(; 
e) and Vd(; 
d) must
intersect (otherwise we would have a pooling equilibrium like in Figure 3b) and the inter-
section is unique since the payo¤s are linear in , as shown in the foregoing discussion.16
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Figure 3. Separating and pooling equilibrium in multiple type economy.
Thus, the only candidates for a two-strategies equilibrium are either the one described in
the Proposition or one where rms with  >  issue debt and rms with  <  issue equity.
If we suppose that the latter is the case, contrary to the Proposition, it is only possible if
Vd is increasing and cuts Ve from below. But the interest rates combination supporting this
16Recall that j is the expected type of rms playing j = e; d.
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situation is impossible. First of all, it must be that 1 2b > Ve(; e) = Vd(; d). If it does
not, all rms playing debt ( > ) have more than rst-best, which contradicts risk-neutral
valuation. But in this case equity market makes positive prot (all issuing equity rms have
less than 1  2b) which contradicts equilibriums concept. The only possible equilibrium is
in Figure 3a where rms with  >  issue equity and rms with  <  issue debt.
(ii) Proof of part 2. Let
d() =
1
F ()
Z 
b
f()d
and
e() =
1
(1  F ())
Z 1 b

f()d
If y  1=2; then for any  2 (b; 1  b); we have b < d() < 1=2 and:
Vd(b; 
d()) > 1  2b > Ve(b; e())
Similarly, since d() < 1=2 < 1  b and e() < 1  b
Vd(1  b; d()) < 1  2b < Ve(1  b; e())
Now dene  () = Vd(; d())   Ve(; e()). From the previous results  (b) > 0 >
 (1   b), hence from the intermediate value theorem there exists  2 (b; 1   b) such that
 () = 0. This proves existence because Ve(; e()) is increasing in , while Vd(; d())
is decreasing in  when d() < 1=2. End proof.
Because the rst-best share price in the rst period is the same for all types, the types
with high  benet from their informational advantages in the second period (when in ac-
tuality they are really lemons). Hence, intuitively the separation equilibrium described
in Proposition 4 should exist if the payo¤ in the given debt strategy is decreasing in .
A su¢ cient condition for existence of this equilibrium is that y  1=2, which means that
the economy is not declining on average. Also, in this case, pooling with debt is not an
equilibrium. The intuition for this condition is the following: pooling with debt is unprof-
itable for stagnating rms because, since there are more growing rms, interest rate prole
corresponds more with them and, as we know, stagnating rms would lose by playing debt.
Thus, stagnating rms tend to signal their type by playing equity. This leads to the following
result.
Proposition 5. 1) If and only if y  1=2, pooling with d is an equilibrium; 2) if
y < 1=2, pooling with e is not an equilibrium; 3) if y  1=2 and if pooling with e exists,
then mispricing is greater under that than under pooling with d.
Proof : see Appendix 2.
As we can see, the only qualitative di¤erence with the basic model is the fact that here the
existence of separationequilibrium, outlined in Proposition 4, is subject to the condition
that the economy is non-declining. This is not surprising because in a two-type model, like
in the one described in Section 3, the grower rm is also growing absolutely, which implies
that the interest rate prole is necessarily downward sloping, making it unprotable for the
stagnating rm to mimic this type by playing debt. In the multiple type case, the condition
y  1=2 insures that in the case of separation, the equilibrium interest rate prole would
necessarily be downward sloping.
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5 Conclusion.
Let us summarize the analysis of the model. Two equilibriums may exist: separating and
pooling. A separating equilibrium exists if and only if the economy is growing on average.
In separating equilibrium rms issuing equity have higher performance in the rst period
and lower performance in the second period. Also equity may be issued only in the case of
separating equilibrium because pooling with debt dominates pooling with equity by minimal
mispricing when economy is stagnating. One can see that these results contrast the standard
GB approach ("good" and "bad" rms) where the solution is typically pooling with debt.
We believe that the idea of signalling the performance prole over time (in contrast or in
addition) to the signalling about total performance provides an interesting insight which
can be applied in other elds of research as well.
Also, the results of the paper are consistent with several nancial phenomena:
(i) Firms issuing equity underperform in the long-run as compared to non-issuing rms
(measured as a decline of prot, prot to assets ratio or prot per share). This is implied
by Propositions 1 and 4: in any equilibrium, where both debt and equity are issued, only
the types with low second period prot issue equity in the rst period.17 At the same
time the performance of rms issuing equity exceeds the performance of the non-issuing
rms at the time of issue (or in the near future after issue). Clearly, this also follows from
Propositions 1 and 4.18 Similarly, the model predicts that leverage is negatively correlated
with protability. In separating equilibrium, rst-period low-protable rms issue debt.19
(ii) This paper suggests a new motive for issuing equity (Propositions 1 and 4) that has
not been explored in existing literature. When the rm knows that it will be high-protable
in the near future and low-protable in the long-term, the entrepreneur may want to issue
equity.
(iii) This model provides a rationale for the link between debt-equity choice and business
cycle. The analysis of the basic model reveals the following ideas. Growing rms prefer debt.
The incentives for stagnating rms depend on the macroeconomic situation. If the economy
is in contraction, stagnating rms may prefer debt, but will necessarily issue equity when the
economy is growing (Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4). Thus, equity issues seem to be procyclical.
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Appendix 1
(i) Proof of part 1. We will show that pooling with e does not survive intuitive criterion.
Consider pooling with e and assume that if a type deviates to d, it is perceived as the typebd. It is enough to show that
min
y
Ve(S ; y)  maxb Vd(S ; bd) (17)
where y < 1=2 and I  bd  S . 1) S < 1=2. From Lemma 3, Vd(S ; bd) < 1  2b. Since
by Lemma 2 Ve(S ; y) > 1   2b, this proves (17). 2) S  1=2. From (9) minimal value of
Ve(S ; y) on feasible support is obtained when y = 1=2 (and equals 1 2b1 b (1   2b + 2bS)).
From (10)
Vd(S ; bd) = 1  b(Sbd + 1  S1  bd ) (18)
Local minimum of expression in brackets under positive bd is bdmin = S pS(1 S)2S 1 . Thus,
the maximal payo¤ of S, if it were playing d, would be:
1  b(2S   1)( S
S  
p
S(1  S)
+
1  Sp
S(1  S)  1 + S
)
Hence (17) is equivalent to the following:
1  2b
1  b (1  2b+ 2bS) > 1  b(2S   1)(
S
S  
p
S(1  S)
+
1  Sp
S(1  S)  1 + S
),
(1  b)(2S   1)2
p
S(1  S)  (22S   2S +
p
S(1  S))(3  4b+ 4bS   2S) > 0
Since S  1=2, the left side is decreasing in b. Thus it is enough to show that this
inequality holds under b = 1   S (because 1   b  S). It can be veried that S(2S  
1)2
p
S(1  S)  (22S   2S +
p
S(1  S))(6S   42S   1) > 0 on feasible support of S.
Thus, the market would attribute the probability 0 to the possibility of playing d by S. The
market would believe that rm is type I after observing debt. In this case, type I would
certainly deviate from pooling with e to d.
(ii) Part 2 follows from Lemma 4. End proof.
Appendix 2.
(i) Proof of part 1. 1) Su¢ ciency. Consider pooling equilibrium where all types play d,
which is supported by o¤-equilibrium market beliefs that the rm is the type 1  b. First of
all, let us verify non-deviation for each type. Consider the case   y. Since 1=2  y  ; we
gets from Lemma 3 Vd(; y)  1 2b. From Lemma 2 we have Ve(; 1 b) < Ve(; ) = 1 2b.
Thus the type  does not deviate. Now, consider the case  < y. From Lemma 2, we have
Ve(; y)  Ve(; 1  b) (19)
The condition of non-deviation for the type  is obviously Vd(; y)  Ve(; 1  b): Given the
condition (19), is is enough to show that Vd(; y)  Ve(; y). This obviously follows from
Lemma 4.
Let us now verify that o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive the intuitive criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987). To show this, let us calculate the maximal payo¤ of type 1   b in the case
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that it plays e. Its payo¤ is evidently maximized if the markets belief places the probability
1 on type b observing equity, i. e. Ve(1   b; b). If o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive intuitive
criterion, this expression must be greater than Vd(1   b; y). From Lemmas 2 and 4 we get
immediately:
Ve(1  b; b)  Ve(1  b; y) > Vd(1  b; y)
This completes the proof of su¢ ciency.
2) As for the necessary condition, if y < 1=2 then pooling with d is impossible because
type 1  b would deviate in e (its equilibrium payo¤ would be less than 1  2b).
(ii) Proof of part 2. We will show that pooling with e does not survive intuitive criterion
when y < 1=2. First, for  such that  > y it can be shown (analogously to Proposition 4)
that
min
y
Ve(; y)  maxb Vd(;b) (20)
if y < 1=2. Thus, the market would attribute the probability 0 to the possibility of playing d
by  if  > y. Evidently in this case d < y. Thus Vd(
d; d) = 1 2b. Also, Ve(d; y) < 1 2b.
Thus d would deviate and pooling with e is impossible.
(iii) Proof of part 3. Let y  1=2. According to part 1, pooling with d exists. Assume
that pooling with e exists. From Lemma 2 Ve(; y) < 1   2b for and only for  < y. As
implied by Lemma 4 for such types Vd(; y)  Ve(; y). Thus mispricing under pooling with
e is larger that under pooling with d. End proof.
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